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Using Consumer Expenditure Survey data this paper shows that
more educated workers demand more high-skill-intensive services
and, to a lower extent, more very low-skill-intensive services (such
as personal services). Additional evidence at the MSA level shows
that this “education elasticity of demand”mechanism can explain
part of the correlation between the share of college-educated work-
ers in a city and the employment share of service industries. The
parametrization of a simple model suggests that this induced de-
mand shift can explain around 6.5% of the relative demand shift
in the US between 1984 and 2002. Similar results are provided for
the UK.
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There is still some disagreement about the causes of the increase in wage in-
equality and in the college premium in the US and in the UK. Several reasons
have been proposed to explain the shift in demand against low skilled workers, in
particular skill-biased technical change, trade liberalization and changes in wage
setting institutions, but none of these explanations seems to be exhaustive (Card
and DiNardo 2002; Acemoglu 2002).
The recent literature on wage inequality has highlighted the phenomenon of
“wage polarization”.1 Together with a novel view of labor demand shifts, the lit-
erature on polarization has sparked a new debate on product demand shifts. On
the one hand, models of unbalanced productivity growth generate second-round
product demand effects – driven by changes in relative prices that depend on the
elasticity of substitution between goods in consumption (Autor and Dorn 2013;
Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2014). On the other hand, other models predict
changes in relative product demand because preferences are non-homothetic or
because educated workers substitute domestic chores for market-provided house-
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1See Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a review. This literature has looked at many countries: Autor,
Katz and Kearney (2006 and 2008) and Autor and Dorn (2013) for the US; Goos and Manning (2007)
for the UK; Spitz-Oener (2006) and Dustmann, Ludsteck and Scho¨nberg (2009) for Germany; Goos,
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hold services when income inequality rises (Manning 2004; Mazzolari and Ragusa
2013). There is, however, disagreement about the relative importance of these
product demand effects in explaining changes in labor demand. Autor and Dorn
(2013) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) look at employment shares in
service occupations and find a limited impact of changes in product demand shifts,
whereas Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013) argue that these effects are substantial.
This paper sheds some light on this discussion and assesses a mechanism which
may explain part of the increase of wage inequality. If individuals with relatively
higher education prefer to consume goods and services whose production is rela-
tively skill intensive, then an increase in the relative supply of skilled labor can
shift demand for final products and raise the relative demand for skills measured
as the college premium. I refer to this mechanism as the “education elasticity
of demand”.2 The time-series evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey data (reported in Table A1 in the online Appendix)
show that the share of head of households with some college education went from
27.5% to 62% from 1972 through 2012. At the same time the share of total expen-
diture in the most skill-intensive services (defined as the sum of health services,
education and personal insurance) rose from 14.4% in 1972 to 20.1% in 2012 while
the combined share of expenditure on food and apparel (two low-skill-intensive
products) declined from 26.1% in 1972 to 17.7% in 2012.
The main idea is presented in a static general equilibrium model with two skill
levels, two sectors producing two aggregate final goods (the high-skill-intensive
and the low-skill-intensive), and non-homothetic preferences. The model relates
the college premium to education elasticities of demand and assesses the impor-
tance of this mechanism on the basis of the estimates produced in the empirical
part of the paper.
In the empirical part, I present two pieces of evidence of the “education elastic-
ity of demand”mechanism, one at the economy-wide level and the second at the
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) level. Firstly, to translate the consumption
patterns into changes in the skill composition of employment and into skilled-
unskilled relative wages, I combine micro data on consumption of 38 non-durable
consumption goods and services from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX)
to data on industry skill composition from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
The estimated education and income elasticities of each consumption item are
then related to the skill intensity of the industries which manufacture the final
consumption good or provide the final consumption service. The results indi-
cate that on average educated consumers tend to favor skill-intensive goods and
services: education, health and professional services have very large education
and income elasticities. There is also a phenomenon of “consumption polariza-
2The focus of this paper is on education elasticities, however, as a complementary mechanism, income
elasticities of demand may also favor skill-intensive products. For this reason I will often refer to non-
homothetic preferences. There is a long-standing macro literature on structural change due to non-
homothetic preferences which focuses on income effects but ignores different consumption preferences
across education groups (Colin Clark 1957; Ngai and Pissarides 2007; Buera and Kaboski 2012).
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tion”i.e. very low-skill-intensive services like food preparation, cleaning, repair
services also have large elasticities (although to a lower extent than high-skill-
intensive services) and give rise to a J-shaped relationship between estimated
elasticities and industry skill intensities. This J-shape remains significant when
Input-Output tables are used to account for the skill intensity of intermediate
inputs. Furthermore, and suggesting a general validity of this mechanism, I show
some evidence in the same direction for the UK using Family Expenditure Survey
(FES) consumption data matched to Labor Force Survey (LFS) data.
The second piece of evidence tests the implications of the theoretical model for
industry employment shares using variation across MSAs and over time in US
Census data. The J-shaped relationship between elasticities and skill intensities
implies a positive product demand effect for both high-skill-intensive and very
low-skill-intensive industry shares. Therefore an exogenous increase in one MSA’s
skill supply (measured as the skill ratio H/L) should raise the employment share
of high-skill-intensive nontradable industries with high education elasticities both
through a supply and a product demand effect. While the effect of demand can be
detected at the MSA level only for nontradables which have a local demand, the
change in H/L at the MSA level is instrumented using changes in H/L in tradable
industries at the national level projected on the MSA’s industrial composition in
1980. Consistent with the model predictions, I find a positive correlation between
employment share growth and education elasticities in nontradable skill-intensive
industries where both the product demand effect and the supply effect are positive.
On the contrary, for the nontradable low-skill-intensive industries, the correlation
is ambiguous because the supply effect is negative.
Finally, to establish the quantitative importance of income and education elas-
ticities in accounting for the rise of the nation-wide college premium, I parametrize
the static general equilibrium model using the estimates of the relevant elasticities
and of labor market aggregates of the US and UK economy. The results indicate
that this consumption mechanism can explain about 6.5% of the total shift in
relative labor demand in the US and a similar proportion of the total shift in the
UK. These results indicate that product demand shifts are not large (although
they are relevant) as claimed by Autor and Dorn (2013) and Goos, Manning, and
Salomons (2014).
This paper contributes to the debate on the importance of demand shifts in
the wage polarization literature matching data on consumption to data on in-
dustry skill intensity. The only previous paper which looks explicitly at changes
in product demand using consumption data is Mazzolari and Ragusa (2013) but
it is limited to consumption of low-skill-intensive services and does not focus on
education elasticities.
The second novel contribution consists in the investigation of the extent to
which exogenous changes in the composition of skills at the MSA level feed back
into higher employment shares of nontradable industries through the “education
elasticity”channel. This empirical evidence at the MSA level is related to the
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literature on local multipliers (Moretti 2010). According to this literature an
exogenous increase in the number of jobs in the tradable sector in a city results
in an increase in local labor demand in the service sector. This paper adds the
explicit account of education elasticities to the argument that positive demand
shocks in the tradable sector have large multiplier effects on the nontradable
sector: I show that the effect of a shock is larger in nontradable sectors that
provide services with a high education elasticity of consumption.
This paper is also related to the early literature on inequality because product
demand shifts due to consumption preferences are part of between-sector shifts.
That literature (Katz and Murphy 1992; Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994;
Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998) found that large part of skill-upgrading and
of the increase in wage inequality occurred mainly within sectors rather than be-
tween sectors but never explicitly investigated the role of product demand shifts.
In this paper I attempt to estimate the contribution of this mechanism to the
overall increase in the college premium in the US and UK.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section I, I present the basic model
whose details are in Appendix A at the end of the paper. The evidence on the
relationship between elasticities and skill intensities is described in Section II,
while Section III looks at the evidence on industry employment shares within
cities (MSAs). Both these sections are divided in subsections which describe
the data, the empirical strategy and the results. In Section IV, I quantify the
contribution of education and income elasticities in explaining the shift in relative
labor demand. The interpretation of the results and the conclusions are in Section
V. An online Appendix collects the details on sample selection and the tables of
descriptive statistics of the many datasets used.
I. The Model
This model is meant as a guidance for the empirical part of the paper and
provides a framework to quantify the importance of the income and education
elasticities of product demand (see Section IV). It is a static general equilibrium
model with two commodities Y1 and Y2 and workers/consumers of two educa-
tion levels (H skilled workers/consumers with a college degree and L unskilled
workers/consumers without a college degree). Consumers’ preferences vary across
education group and are non-homothetic in income. In this Section I outline the
main assumptions and describe the main predictions of the model. I refer to the
Appendix A at the end of the paper for all the equations and the details.
The demand functions for the two commodities have a generic form:
p1Y1 = Hy
h
1 (
p1
p2
, wh) + Ly
l
1(
p1
p2
, wl)(1)
Y2 = Hy
h
2 (
p1
p2
, wh) + Ly
l
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p2
, wl)(2)
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where p1p2 is the relative price of the skill-intensive commodity and wh (wl) is the
wage of skilled (unskilled) workers. Equation 1 denotes the total demand for the
high-skill-intensive commodity Y1 as the sum of demand by the H skilled workers
and by the L unskilled workers. Equation 2 has the same interpretation for the
low-skill-intensive commodity Y2 and p2 is normalized to one.
In this model there is a role for education elasticities because the per-capita
demand functions for both high-skill and low-skill-intensive commodities yi1(.)
and yi2(.) are assumed to depend from education i = h, l. The hypothesis of the
model (to be verified in the data) is that college-educated workers have different
consumption preferences and may spend more on specific types of goods and
services such as the education of their own children, health services, professional
goods and services, books and newspapers. Skilled and unskilled workers are also
allowed to have different income elasticities (preferences are non-homothetic and
income elasticities may differ from unit value).
Using the equations above and market clearing, the elasticity of the skill pre-
mium with respect to the skill ratio can be written as:3
(3)
d logwh
d logH
=
(1− a2){(λH − λL)[R1 − (1−R1)HL ]− [1 + λH + HL (1 + λL)]}
(λL + 1)σ + (λH − λL)(1− a1)σ − (λH − λL)T
where T = {R1[(a1 − a2)εh1p + (1 − a2)εh1m] + (1 − R1)[(a1 − a2)εl1p − a2εl1m]}.
R1 =
Hyh1 (.)
Hyh1 (.)+Ly
l
1(.)
is the share of total expenditure that skilled workers spend on
the high-skill-intensive commodity. εi1m is the income elasticity of demand for the
high-skill-intensive commodity, the index i = h, l indicates that the elasticity is
different for skilled and unskilled consumers.4 a1, a2 are the wage bill shares of
skilled labor in the two sectors, λH and λL are the ratios of skilled and unskilled
labor and σ is the elasticity of substitution (see Appendix A for details).
The model has two main predictions which I will test in the following empirical
sections:
1) The main prediction of the model relates education and income elasticities
to the change in the skill premium. The effect of education elasticities
contributes to increase the skill premium through the term R1. An increase
in HL tends to increase wage inequality if skilled workers demand more of the
3Notice that this model improves on Katz and Murphy (1992) key equation log wh
wl
= α+βt+γ log H
L
adding the effect of elasticities. Unlike Acemoglu and Autor (2011) who explain wage polarization
with three skill levels and task-replacing technological progress, the model in this paper cannot explain
polarization. I use a model with two skill levels because a model with three skill levels would imply
estimating consumption elasticities of workers with a mid level of education which are insignificantly
different from other education groups’ elasticities.
4Due to normalization, elasticities are in relative terms with respect to commodity 2. The equation
depends also from εi1p however in this paper I consider education as the driving force of consumption
preferences and I view prices as endogenous, therefore price elasticities will not be estimated in the
benchmark specification in the empirical part. Other papers focus on price effects on wage inequality,
for example Cortes (2008) and Moretti (2013).
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high-skill-intensive commodity than unskilled workers, i.e. yh1 (.) > y
l
1(.).
5
The traditional income elasticity is distinct from the education elasticity
and works within education groups. Income elasticities (which are typically
positive) contribute to explain the rise of the skill premium reducing the
denominator of Equation 3. If richer workers within both education groups
tend to consume more of the skill-intensive commodity (i.e. εh1m and ε
l
1m > 1
for both skilled and unskilled workers), then an increase in the average level
of income (both wl and wh) will also shift out the relative demand of the
skill-intensive commodity and increase the college premium.
2) The second prediction of the model is for sectoral employment shares. The
employment share of the skill-intensive sector is e1 =
H1+L1
H+L . The effect
of an increase in skill intensity d logH on e1 is positive because of the
concurrent supply and demand effects: the increase in the number of skilled
workers will raise employment in the sector and in turn increase demand
of the final commodity produced there. This prediction of the model will
be tested in Section III, studying the relationship between changes in H/L
and industry employment shares within cities under the assumption that
services cannot be traded outside the city-specific local labor market.
II. Evidence on the Relationship between Elasticities and Skill Intensities
In this section I test the first prediction of the model: the education elasticity of
demand mechanism may explain part of the increase in the college premium only
if more educated (and richer) consumers tend to consume more skill-intensive
products and services. To test this hypothesis I first match consumption data
to skill intensity data, then I regress estimated elasticities on skill intensities.
For reasons of space, the details on sample selection and all tables of descriptive
statistics of US and UK data used in this section (Tables A2 to A8) are in the
online Appendix. The tables of results for the UK (Tables A10 and A11) are also
in the online Appendix.
A. The Match of Expenditure and Industry Skill Intensity Data
The data on consumption are drawn from the CEX. A consistent dataset is
available at NBER from 1984 to 2002 while data are available online at the Bureau
of Labor Statistics through 2012. Since the purpose of the paper is to assess if
education elasticities may explain part of the increase in the college premium in
the US and UK, I select the time period between 1994 to 1997 in the mid of
5The term R1 increases the numerator of Equation 3 if R1 >
H
H+L
i.e. if yh1 (.) > y
l
1(.). If educated and
non-educated workers had the same demand for the high-skill-intensive commodity (i.e. yh1 (.) = y
l
1(.)),
then R1 =
H
H+L
and the term (λH − λL)[R1 − (1 − R1)HL ] would disappear and the numerator of
Equation 3 would then be unambiguously negative.
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the period of rapidly rising inequality and run robustness checks on other time
periods in Section II.F and Table 3.6
I use data on all items whose consumption has been consistently recorded from
1994 to 1997 (38 items). I include in total expenditure housing rent but exclude
own-property housing expenditures (property taxes, interest on house loans and
housing intermediate goods) because they cannot be easily matched with an in-
dustry and vehicle purchase (whose income elasticity is very high given that this is
an infrequent purchase).7 Total expenditure is the sum over the 38 items and rep-
resents 84% of total expenditure as provided by NBER. The final sample includes
23,268 households and their expenditure shares on 38 non-durable consumption
items. The average age of the head of household is around 45 years, 52% of heads
have at least some college education (defined as 13 or more years of education),
60% are males (see Table A2 in the online Appendix).
To assess whether more educated and richer consumers consume relatively more
skill-intensive goods and services, I match the information on individual consump-
tion items from the CEX to the skill intensity of the industry which produces the
final good or service calculated from the CPS. For each matched industry in the
CPS, I calculate two different measures of skill intensity: a raw measure and a
measure which accounts for intermediate inputs (the results are in Table A3 and
A4 in the online Appendix).
The first measure of industry skill intensity is the share of workers who attained
some college education (defined as 13 or more years of schooling). To avoid
potential reverse causality skill intensity is calculated on CPS data 1979-1980
and is predetermined to elasticities estimated in 1994-1997. Among low-skill-
intensive industries there are food products, eating and drinking places, apparel
production, repair services, personal services, household supplies and household
services. Among high-skill-intensive industries there are business and professional
services, education, health and social services and financial services and insurance.
The second measure is adjusted for the skill intensity of intermediate inputs
using Input-Output tables in year 1995 (the 3-digit industry code of the CPS
is matched to the 123-industry Input-Output industry code in Table A5 in the
online Appendix). I account for intermediate inputs because the 38 industries
which have a direct match to a consumption item represent only about 57% of
total employment in the US economy and input-producing industries may have a
different skill intensity than those that produce the final output.
The input-adjusted skill intensity of final product j is calculated as zINPUTj =
6The data both in the US (Lemieux 2006; Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008; Heathcote, Perri, and
Violante 2010) and in the UK (Machin and VanReenen 2008; Blundell and Etheridge 2010) show that
the growth of the college wage premium was rapid through the 1980s and the 1990s then it slowed down.
7The reason that durables are often excluded is that the system of Engel curves is derived on the
basis of the utility flow from consumption which can be read straight from the expenditure only for non-
durables. For durables in principle we need to impute a service flow from the stock and expenditures on
durables. As a robustness check I include also vehicle purchase and own-property housing to reach 100%
of expenditure: the results regarding education elasticities are qualitatively unaltered (results available
upon request).
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i
Iij
ΣiIij
zi, where zi is the skill intensity of intermediate industry i. The weights
Iij
ΣiIij
indicate industry’s i input contribution to produce one unit of product in
industry j and are obtained multiplying the input shares of each industry i by the
share of total output of the same industry i that goes to salaries i.e. the weights
measure the salary-weighted contributions of workers in each industry i to output
of industry j.8
Taking into account intermediate inputs increases the skill intensity of the low-
skill-intensive items and reduces the skill intensity of the high-skill-intensive items.
This happens because the low-skill-intensive intermediate inputs, in particular
the retail sector (which is an intermediate input in I-O tables), reduce the skill
intensity of all final products; however for the low-skill-intensive final products
the effect of the retail sector is offset by the contribution of other intermediate
inputs which are relatively more skill intensive such as the contribution of the
public sector. The estimated correlation coefficient between the raw measure and
the adjusted measure is 0.88.
B. Data for the UK
The UK sample is drawn from FES data 1994-1997 and includes 26,189 house-
holds and their expenditure on 42 non-durable consumption items (see the online
Appendix for sample selection, Table A6 for descriptive statistics and Table A7
for the match to LFS data). There is a large difference between the US and the
UK data in the percentage of heads of household with some college education:
52% in the US sample (CEX 1994-1997) and 21% in the UK sample (some college
in the UK is defined as those who left full time education after their 18th year of
age). By the same token, skill intensity of the producing industries in the UK is
much lower than in the US when measured as the share of workers with a degree
level education or more (20% of the total). Therefore in order to establish a better
comparison with the US, I consider for the UK also skill intensity calculated as
the share of workers with more than high school (48% of the total). Both skill
intensities are calculated on LFS 1994-1997 data (not earlier because of indus-
try codes’ consistency) and are adjusted for the use of intermediate inputs with
weights that reflect the salary-weighted contribution of workers of other industries
(see Table A8 in the online Appendix).
8As an illustration of the construction of weights I offer the following example that I owe to an
anonymous referee. Suppose that two industries have the following expenditure structure: Industry A:
40% salaries, 20% interest on capital, 20% purchases of inputs from industry B, 20% purchases of inputs
from industry A (within sector trading); Industry B: 60% salaries, 20% capital, 10% imports from abroad,
10% purchases of inputs from industry A. When a consumer spends $100 on goods of industry A, that
industry will pay salaries of $40 to its employees. It will also make purchases from industries B and A
which lead to salaries of $12 =(100*0.2*0.6) and $8 =(100*0.2*0.4). Ignoring further iterations of the
input-output relationships, the salary-weighted contributions of workers in A and B to output of industry
A would be 80% =($48/$60) and 20% =($12/$60), respectively.
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C. Econometric Specification
The empirical strategy is in two steps: first I estimate education and income
elasticities, then I regress the estimates on the corresponding industry’s skill in-
tensity. I estimate a system of 38 equations; for each item the specification is:
(4) ωij = aj + bjX
′
i + γjedi + εij for j = 1, .., 38.
ωij =
pjyij
xi
is the expenditure share of item j by household i, Xi contains the
age and sex of the head of household and the number of children under 18 in
the household, edi is an education dummy which is equal to one if the head
of household has some college education. The 38 equations are stacked in a
fixed effect regression with constraints. To be consistent with a demand system
(
∑
j
ωij = 1), the following restrictions are imposed:
∑
j
aj = 1,
∑
j
bj = 0 for each
bj ,
∑
j
γj = 0. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. I do not
include prices because 38 prices are collinear.9
Although the focus of the model of Section I is mainly on education elastic-
ities, I also estimate income elasticities because they work as a complementary
mechanism which may also favor skill-intensive products so that rising income
will reinforce the education demand effect. In a second specification of System
4, instead of the term in the head’s education level, I introduce a term in log
expenditure where δj log xi is the log of real (deflated by CPI index) total expen-
diture of household i with restrictions
∑
j
δj = 0. Income elasticities are a more
popular concept in empirical work and, while education elasticities reflect the
consumption response to permanent income changes, income elasticities reflect
the response to current income.
The education elasticities are equal to η̂edj =
γ̂j∗ed
ωj
where ωj is the average bud-
get share of item j and ed is the percentage of heads of household who have some
college education (52% in US data); weighted by the average share in the budget,
they average to zero across the 38 expenditure items. The budget elasticities are
equal to η̂budgetj =
δ̂j
ωj
+ 1 and their weighted average is equal to one.10
9In Section IV where I bring the theoretical model to the data I aggregate the 38 items in two
aggregate groups (high-skill and low-skill-intensive). At that point I include also a relative price index
constructed as the aggregation of the single items’ prices and I estimate the price elasticities needed to
parametrize the model.
10Income elasticities refer to quantities while I have expenditure shares i.e. budget elasticities. For
convenience in the text and in the tables I often call them income elasticities. The theory model implies
two distinct income elasticities, one by each education group, however I estimate one common income
elasticity because the coefficient estimates are rarely different across education group.
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Table 1—Estimates of Education and Income Elasticities.
Education Education Income Income Skill
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Intensity
Domestic Services 0.008 0.185 0.005 1.238 0.131
Clothing and Shoes 0.007 0.074 0.006 1.116 0.136
Household Supplies 0.006 0.100 0.011 1.321 0.163
Food Off-Premise -0.052 -0.147 -0.047 0.740 0.236
Clothing Services 0.000 0.024 -0.001 0.907 0.240
Repairs, Greasing, Parking etc. 0.012 0.211 0.012 1.380 0.240
Jewelry and Watches 0.002 0.208 0.003 1.658 0.242
Tobacco Products -0.012 -0.415 -0.004 0.716 0.255
Alcohol On-Premise 0.002 0.149 0.001 1.140 0.265
Food On-Premise 0.013 0.121 0.005 1.092 0.266
Barbershops, Beauty Parlors etc. 0.001 0.041 0.000 0.973 0.273
Taxicab, Railway, Bus and Travel 0.001 0.272 0.002 1.542 0.275
Mass Transit Systems -0.001 -0.073 0.000 0.914 0.277
Magazines, Newspapers, Toys etc. 0.007 0.182 -0.001 0.942 0.282
Housing -0.025 -0.099 -0.028 0.787 0.282
Tires, Tubes, Accessories and Parts 0.000 -0.018 0.001 1.142 0.297
Alcohol Off-Premise 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.949 0.339
Water and Other Sanitary Services -0.001 -0.040 -0.001 0.962 0.346
Ophthalmic Products 0.001 0.152 0.001 1.245 0.355
Gas -0.003 -0.109 -0.002 0.878 0.378
Gasoline and Oil -0.007 -0.070 -0.005 0.903 0.381
Recreation and Sports Equipment 0.009 0.184 0.010 1.398 0.410
Electricity -0.012 -0.141 -0.006 0.868 0.422
Other Recreation Services 0.013 0.176 0.010 1.242 0.441
Telephone and Telegraph -0.003 -0.040 -0.005 0.866 0.458
Drug Preparations -0.004 -0.190 -0.001 0.938 0.467
Fuel Oil and Coal -0.002 -0.225 0.000 0.910 0.473
Health Insurance -0.004 -0.056 -0.004 0.910 0.532
Expense of Handling Life Insurance 0.002 0.090 0.005 1.371 0.539
Auto Insurance 0.002 0.032 0.005 1.163 0.539
Hospitals 0.000 -0.005 0.002 1.446 0.543
Airline Fares 0.007 0.421 0.005 1.625 0.550
Religious and Welfare Activities 0.007 0.216 0.000 1.024 0.590
Business Services 0.002 0.054 0.006 1.439 0.620
Physicians, Dentists, Medical Prof. 0.004 0.134 0.006 1.363 0.671
Other Education Services 0.005 0.324 0.005 1.606 0.699
Nursery, Elem. and Sec. Education 0.002 0.435 0.001 1.422 0.719
Higher Education 0.012 0.495 0.005 1.426 0.800
Note: Income and education elasticities are estimated with two different specifications of System 4 on
23,298 households pooling CEX data between year 1994 and 1997. Consumption items are sorted by the
skill intensity of the producing industry (last column). Skill intensity is calculated from CPS 1979-80
data. Standard errors are not shown for reasons of space.
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Figure 1. Elasticities and skill intensities US
Note: Fitted values are predicted by a weighted OLS regression of education elasticities on industry skill
intensity measured in 1980 and its square. Weights are the mean shares of the consumption items in total
expenditure. Elasticities are estimated on pooled CEX 1994-1997 data, skill intensity on CPS 1979-1980
data.
D. Regression Results of Elasticities and Skill Intensities
Table 1 shows the estimated coefficients on the education dummy and on total
expenditure for each one of the 38 items estimated on the CEX pooled sample of
years 1994-1997. The coefficients on education and total expenditure are obtained
with two separate systems. For ease of interpretation, the items are ranked in
ascending order according to the skill intensity of their producing industries which
is shown in the last column of Table 1. The Table also shows the education and
income elasticities. Poorly educated head of households tend to spend relatively
more (i.e. low education elasticity) on food consumed at home and utilities;
high-educated heads allocate a large proportion of their family budget to low-skill-
intensive services such as repairs and domestic services and an even larger share to
high-skill-intensive services such as medical and business services and expenditure
on education of all levels. A similar pattern is evident for income elasticities. The
coefficient of correlation between income and education elasticities is 0.78 thus
indicating that the effect of current and permanent income on consumption is
similar.
Figure 1 plots education elasticities against skill intensity (calculated in 1979-
1980), together with a linear and a quadratic fit obtained by a OLS regression
weighted by the mean expenditure share of each consumption item (a measure
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of the importance of the item in the household budget). The coefficient on the
linear weighted regression is 0.32 (0.17). When the same education elasticities are
plotted against skill intensity adjusted for intermediate inputs, the results do not
change much and the linear coefficient becomes 0.47 (0.27). The significant coef-
ficients of the linear regressions of Table 2 indicate that educated individuals tend
to consume on average more high-skill-intensive goods and services. The magni-
tude of the coefficient, however, is not very informative because it is expressed in
elasticities units and one needs a model to quantify how much an increase in the
skill ratio is translated into an increase in the skill premium (see Section IV).
While the model implies a positive relationship between elasticities and skill
intensities, Figure 1 suggests a more nuanced pattern of “polarization of con-
sumption”towards consumption items at the two extremes of the skill intensity
distribution. For this reason I estimate a quadratic relationship as well as a linear
one. Although the elasticities tend to be higher for both low-skill-intensive and
high-skill-intensive consumption items, the overall demand shift is mainly in favor
of skill-intensive products and services and the shape of the relationship is a J
shape rather than a U shape.
Table 2 reports the results of the linear (and quadratic) regression:
(5) η̂j = α+ βzj + εj
where η̂j is in turn the education and the income elasticity for commodity j
and zj is skill intensity of industry j. All regressions are weighted by the mean
share of the consumption item in total expenditure (regressions weighted by the
inverse of the estimated variance yield very similar results).
In Panel A of Table 2, education and income elasticities are regressed on the
skill intensity zj of the manufacturing industry in 1979-1980. The table shows
that the positive relationship of skill intensities with income elasticities is even
stronger than the one with education elasticities: the coefficient on the linear
regression is 0.58 (0.26) and 0.82 (0.42) for income elasticities. The coefficients
of the quadratic regressions show that the J-shaped relationship holds for both
education and income elasticities. Panel B confirms the results of Panel A using
the adjusted skill intensity measure which accounts for the contribution of inter-
mediate inputs. Table A9 in the online Appendix shows some robustness checks
excluding expenditure on education from the regression or separating tradable
goods and nontradable services.11
11If I exclude the expenditure item regarding education from the regression, the linear regression loses
significance but the quadratic relationship remains significant. Separating nontradables and tradables,
the results indicate significant coefficients on the linear and quadratic terms for nontradables and in-
significant coefficient for tradables. This is consistent with the fact that the hypothesis advanced in this
paper applies mostly to nontraded services whose domestic demand is what matters while the demand
of American traded goods is a function also of the tastes of consumers all over the world. Finally the
table shows that the positive J-shaped relationship holds also with coefficients rather than elasticities
and therefore is not due to the transformation of the coefficients into elasticities.
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Table 2—OLS Regression of Estimated Education and Income Elasticities on Two Measures
of Skill Intensity
Dependent variable Education Elasticity Income Elasticity
Panel A
Skill intensity 1980 0.322* -1.806** 0.581** -2.325**
(0.170) (0.707) (0.264) (1.129)
Skill intensity 1980 squared 2.641*** 3.607**
(0.856) (1.368)
Constant -0.110* 0.254* 0.802*** 1.299***
(0.0630) (0.131) (0.0977) (0.209)
R-squared 0.091 0.285 0.119 0.265
Panel B
Adjusted skill intensity 0.468* -4.532*** 0.824* -5.900**
(0.269) (1.575) (0.419) (2.547)
Adjusted skill intensity squared 5.865*** 7.887**
(1.825) (2.953)
Constant -0.178* 0.826** 0.688*** 2.037***
(0.105) (0.326) (0.163) (0.527)
R-squared 0.078 0.288 0.097 0.250
Note: N=38. OLS regressions weighted by the mean share of the consumption item. Income and
education elasticities are estimated on pooled CEX data 1994-1997. Skill intensity in Panel A is the
proportion of workers with some college education in total industry employment in CPS 1979-1980 data,
in Panel B skill intensity is adjusted using Input-Output tables. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 2. Elasticities and skill intensities UK
Note: Fitted values are predicted by an OLS regression of education elasticities on industry skill intensity
and its square. Skill intensity is measured as the proportion of workers with some college on LFS 1994-
1997 data, education elasticities are estimated on pooled FES 1994-1997 data.
E. Regression Results for the UK
The results on UK data are presented in Figure 2 which is the equivalent of
Figure 1 for the US (except that skill intensity is calculated in 1994-97 instead of
1979-80). The coefficient of the weighted linear regression is 0.11 (0.09). Also in
the UK the relationship between elasticities and skill intensities has a polarized
shape and the results regarding income elasticities (not shown) resemble those for
education elasticities.
Since skill intensity in all sectors is much lower in the UK than in the US,
in order to improve the comparison with the US I also use a definition of skill
based on high-school diploma in the UK. When this measure of skill intensity is
used, the coefficient of the linear regression of education elasticities (the education
dummy in the system of equation indicates heads of households with high school
or more) on skill intensities becomes 0.45 (0.20) (see Table A10 and A11 in the
online Appendix for the UK results).
The validity of the positive J-shaped relationship also for the UK lends credence
to the consumption elasticity mechanism. The relationship holds notwithstanding
the differences between the US and the UK in the share of educated workers and
in the size of the public sector for education and health which affects the incidence
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of out of pocket expenditures on those services.12 It is reassuring that the positive
relationship between elasticities and skill intensities holds in two countries with
public sectors of different size.
F. Interpretation and Extension of the Results
In this section I discuss whether elasticity estimates may reflect composition
effects or time trends, rather than a true “education effect”.
Family type. — One may wonder whether the J-shaped relationship is driven
by composition effects, for example different family types. In the recent litera-
ture on polarization the increase in consumption of low-skill-intensive services is
attributed to the increasing education of women: more educated women have a
higher opportunity cost of time and buy low-skill-intensive services on the market
(Black and Spitz-Oener 2009; Cortes and Tessada 2011; Mazzolari and Ragusa
2013). Panel A of Table 3 shows that the significant relationship between elas-
ticities and skill intensities is not driven by families where the spouse is college
educated. I find that there are no major differences across family types (single
heads, families with college- and non-college-educated spouses). The correlation
between education elasticities estimated on the sample of singles and of families
with low-educated (high-educated) spouses is 0.88 (0.77), while the correlation
between education elasticities of families with low- and high-skilled spouses is
0.72. This suggests that the explanation based on product demand elasticities is
likely to work independently of the explanation based on an increase in consump-
tion of market-provided services because of an increase in the opportunity cost of
time for women.
Time trends. — One further concern is that the pattern of education elasticities
may capture some time trends. For example Autor and Dorn (2013) show that
wage polarization appeared in the 1990s but it is not in the data in the 1980s. One
could argue that, if product demand elasticities contribute to polarization, then
the quadratic relationship between elasticities and skill intensities may follow the
same timing.
In Panel B of Table 3 I divide the data in three periods (1984-1989, 1990-1996
and 1997-2002) to verify whether the estimates of elasticities (or their relationship
with skill intensity) change over time.13 The coefficients of a linear regression of
12Consumption surveys (both FES and CEX) collect information only about private consumption
however much of total consumption is public government consumption which may also plausibly react
to changes in the education composition of the electorate. This may reinforce or partially offset the
mechanism based on private consumption highlighted here.
13The micro data of the Consumer Expenditure Survey are available from 1984 to 2012 but the NBER
dataset with a consistent aggregation of expenditures stops in 2002. Since the purpose of this paper is
to assess the effect of consumption elasticities on the increase of the college premium, the most relevant
decades are the 1980s and the 1990s, while in the year 2000s the increase in inequality slowed down
(Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006 and 2008).
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Table 3—Education Elasticities: Family Composition and Time Effects
Panel A: Elasticities by Family Type
Singles Spouse less than college Spouse some college
Adj. skill intensity 0.537** -4.052** 0.201 -3.584*** 0.059 -2.629**
(0.264) (1.576) (0.215) (1.278) (0.172) (1.037)
Adj. skill intensity squared 5.374*** 4.432*** 3.106**
(1.824) (1.480) (1.184)
Constant -0.201* 0.721** -0.075 0.685** -0.023 0.521**
(0.102) (0.326) (0.082) (0.265) (0.068) (0.217)
R-squared 0.103 0.282 0.024 0.225 0.003 0.167
Panel B: Elasticities Estimated Over Time
Years 1984-1989 Years 1990-1995 Years 1996-2002
Adj. skill intensity 0.396 -5.028*** 0.488* -4.797*** 0.555** -4.466***
(0.263) (1.477) (0.269) (1.555) (0.261) (1.535)
Adj. skill intensity squared 6.416*** 6.221*** 5.853***
(1.727) (1.809) (1.769)
Constant -0.149 0.929*** -0.185* 0.872** -0.212** 0.802**
(0.102) (0.303) (0.105) (0.321) (0.103) (0.319)
R-squared 0.059 0.325 0.084 0.315 0.111 0.323
Note: N=38. Each column is the result of a OLS regression of education elasticities on skill intensity
weighted by the mean budget share of the consumption item. Skill intensity is always adjusted for
intermediate inputs. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level.
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education elasticities on input-adjusted skill intensity are 0.396 (0.263), 0.488
(0.269) and 0.555 (0.261) in the three periods. The pairwise correlation between
education elasticities of the three periods is very high, between 0.98 and 0.99 (the
same for income elasticities). The high correlation suggests that the mechanism
based on elasticities is stable over time and does not simply capture some time
trend.
If consumption preferences are stable over time, then an increase in skill supply
should correspond to a proportional increase in consumption of skill-intensive
goods and services. While in this paper I focus on cross-sectional evidence of the
relationship between elasticities and skill intensities, time series evidence already
cited in the Introduction seems to be consistent with this implication. Table A1
in the online Appendix reports the expenditure shares of the main consumption
aggregates in each decade from 1972 through 2012. In the decades from 1984 to
2012 the skill supply (the share of heads of households with more than 12 years of
education) grew approximately by 1% per year or less and the expenditure share of
skill-intensive services (the sum of health, education and personal insurance) went
up approximately by 1% a decade while the share of food, tobacco and apparel
combined (two low-skill-intensive products) went down by 1% a decade.14
III. Evidence on Industry Employment Shares within MSAs
In this section I test the second implication of the model of Section I using vari-
ation within cities (MSAs). The model predicts that the increase in the relative
number of skilled workers will increase employment shares of skill-intensive in-
dustries and decrease that of low-skill-intensive industries. On top of this supply
effect there will be a positive demand effect on industry employment shares that
will be larger the larger is the education elasticity of consumption.15
This prediction can be tested on industry data at the MSA level with two
provisions. Firstly we have to focus only on nontradables: the predicted effect of
education elasticities on industry employment shares is expected to be detectable
within cities if we assume that services cannot be traded outside of a local labor
market. On the contrary there should be no effect for tradables at the local level:
the market for tradables is national, and much of the additional local demand
14Under the assumption that consumption preferences do not change over time, a rapid growth of
skill supply should imply a more rapid shift in product demand. During the 1970s, the supply of skilled
workers was increasing much faster than in later periods thanks to a vast expansion in the number and
size of public institutions of higher education (Katz and Goldin 2008). In Table A1 the share of educated
heads of household rose from 27.5% in 1972 to 43% in 1984 while the expenditure share of food and
apparel fell by 3% and the share of skill-intensive services (health, education and personal insurance)
went up only by 0.4%. Unfortunately there are no micro data before 1984 therefore we cannot say if
education elasticities were the same in the 1970s as in later periods. Apparently in that period most
expenditure shifted to housing and transportation and only partially to skill-intensive services.
15Although the model has equivalent predictions for industry wage bill shares whH1+wlL1
H+L
, the analysis
at the MSA level is limited to employment shares because the analysis of industry wage bill shares faces
an additional problem: unless skilled workers earn the same college premium across all industries, the
wage bill share will reflect also the different premia across industries and not necessarily reflect increased
consumption demand.
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is likely to benefit other cities. For this reason I will use the tradable sectors as
control group in a specification check.
Secondly, to break down the model at the MSA level we need some assumptions
relative to cross-city labor mobility and wage adjustment. I follow the framework
recently proposed in the literature on local multipliers (Moretti, 2010). I assume
the existence of an upward-sloping local labor supply which depends on the degree
of labor mobility across MSAs and I assume further that within a MSA labor is
mobile across sectors so that marginal product and wages of each skill group are
equalized across sectors.
In consequence of a positive demand shock to the skill ratio H/L in tradable
industry j in MSA m (due for example to an exogenous nationwide increase in
skill intensity combined with the particularly favorable industrial composition of
MSA m), employment share of industry j will increase but the shock may also
affect local employment in other industries (i.e. the local multiplier effect). In
fact the shock will increase the relative wage of skilled workers in the city and will
attract existing residents and new immigrants, depending on the degree of labor
mobility across MSAs. On top of this supply effect, which increases employment
shares of skill-intensive industries, there will be a positive demand effect on all
nontradable local industries that will be larger the larger is the education elasticity
of demand.16
In the following I estimate the effect of an increase of H/L in tradable industries
on the employment share of nontradable industries allowing for labor mobility and
wage adjustment at the MSA level. I use the skill ratio in tradables only because
it is less polluted by reverse causality (there is a mechanical relationship between
the skill ratio in a MSA and employment in skill-intensive sectors in the same
city). Before introducing the estimation strategy I will briefly describe the data.
A. Census Data at the MSA Level
I use the 5% sample of decennial census in 1980, 1990 and 2000 Integrated
Public Use Microsample Series (IPUMS) files, the only data which have sufficient
sample size for MSA-level analysis (see the online Appendix for sample selection
details and Tables A12 and A13 for descriptive statistics). After selecting a
balanced sample of MSAs which are present in all decades and keeping only MSA-
industry cells with more than 200 workers in 1980, the final dataset contains 4,130
observations on 163 MSAs each of which with a different number of industries
(the observation of nontradables industries are 3,186, the rest are tradables). The
observations are MSA-industry-year weighted averages (using IPUMs personal
weights) and, since the regressions are in changes, the final sample includes two
observations per each MSA and each industry, corresponding to the periods 1980-
1990 and 1990-2000.
16The general equilibrium effect on wages and prices may partially undo the effect of the increase in
demand for local services making labor costs higher and reducing their supply, however, if local labor
supply is very elastic, labor costs will not increase much and the offsetting effect will be small.
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Because the model predicts different effects in skill-intensive sectors (where both
supply and demand effects are positive) and in low-skill-intensive sectors (where
the supply effect is negative), the sample is divided in high-skill and low-skill non-
tradables (see Table A12 in the online Appendix). A simple regression of changes
in employment shares on changes in the (log) skill ratio within MSA yields a
positive significant coefficient for high-skill-intensive industries, a negative signif-
icant coefficient for low-skill-intensive industries and a insignificant coefficient for
tradables.17 These results are consistent with the evidence of the previous section
and indicate that employment shares of skill-intensive services rise more in cities
where there is more skill upgrading but they do not account explicitly for the
consumption elasticity channel.
B. The Empirical Strategy
To account for elasticities I estimate the following equation where, for ease of in-
terpretation of the interaction coefficient, the sectors are grouped with a high/low
education elasticity dummy (highj indicates an industry j with education elas-
ticity higher than the median):
∆Emp ShareNTRjmt = α+ β0(∆
H
L
TR
mt
) + β1highj + β2(∆
H
L
TR
mt
× highj)(6)
+δj + γm + η1990−2000 + εjmt.
∆Emp ShareNTRjmt is the decadal change in the share of the MSAs’ m workforce
employed in nontradable (NTR) industry j between 1980 and 1990 and between
1990 and 2000 (indicated by t). ∆HL
TR
mt
is the decadal change in the log of the
skill ratio in tradable (TR) industries in MSA m: to avoid the potential reverse
causality, ∆HL
TR
mt
is measured using changes in the skill ratio only in the tradable
sector. The coefficient of interest is β2 which captures the differential effect on
the employment share of nontradable sectors with high education elasticity. All
regressions include MSA and industry fixed effects and one time (decade) dummy
to control for common local, industry and temporal shocks and are weighted by
the average employment of the industry j of city m in 1980.18 Standard errors
are clustered at the MSA level.
17The coefficients on the log skill ratio in regressions which include decade, MSA and industry dummies
are 0.020 (0.004), -0.035 (0.017) and 0.027 (0.037) respectively. The cross-MSA average employment share
of a high-skill (low-skill) intensive industry in 1980 is 7% (6%), of a tradable industry is 5.3% (Table A13
of descriptive statistics in the online Appendix).
18Time-invariant differences across MSAs are controlled for by MSA dummies but the coefficients
might be biased by city-specific time-variant shocks that are correlated with both changes in the MSA’s
skill ratio and changes in industry employment shares. To test the robustness of these results I include
in the regressions the MSA-level changes in sex ratios, in average age and in the share of immigrants to
control for other concurrent secular changes in labor supply that may affect the growth of some industries,
mainly low-skill-intensive sectors which are also intensive in female and immigrant labor. Results are
qualitatively unchanged and are available upon request.
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Table 4—Changes in Nontradable and Tradable Industries’ Employment Shares at the MSA
Level
High-Skill Low-Skill Tradables (TR1)
Nontradables Nontradables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
∆log(H
L
TR
mt
) -0.002 -0.007 0.023* -0.225
(0.002) (0.036) (0.013) (0.688)
High elasticity 0.003 -0.012*** 0.011*** 0.025* 0.009 0.060
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.014) (0.059)
∆log(H
L
TR
mt
)*High elast 0.009*** 0.045*** -0.026** -0.050
(0.002) (0.012) (0.010) (0.036)
∆log(H
L
TR0
mt
) -0.006 -0.096
(0.025) (0.170)
∆log(H
L
TR0
mt
)*High elast -0.032 0.255
(0.039) (0.174)
Observations 1,530 1,530 794 794 159 159
R-squared 0.256 0.280 0.392
P > F Excl Instrument1 0.685 0.893 0.697
P > F Excl Instrument2 6.03e-10 2.74e-08 0.0327
Note: In the first four columns the dependent variable is the decadal (1980-1990 and 1990-2000) change
in nontradable (NTR) industry employment shares; the independent variable is the decadal change in
the log skill ratio in tradable (TR) industries. In the last two columns changes in employment shares
in tradables group TR1 are regressed on changes in the log skill ratios in tradables group TR0. Low-
skill/high-skill nontradables and tradables (group TR0 and TR1) are defined in Table A12 in the online
Appendix. The instruments are a weighted sum of tradable industry decadal growth of H/L projected
on initial MSAs industry structure in 1980. All models contain MSA and industry dummies and one
time dummy. The dummy “High elasticity”indicates sectors with education elasticity higher than the
median =0.09. Only MSA-industry cells with at least 200 employees in 1980 are in the sample. All
regressions are weighted by the average employment of industry i in city m in 1980. Robust standard
errors clustered by MSA. *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. *
Significant at the 10 percent level.
To identify exogenous changes in the skill ratio of the tradable sector, I use
as an instrument the weighted average of nationwide skill intensity growth in
tradable industries, with weights reflecting the city-specific employment share in
those sectors in 1980. The instrument is ∆̂HL
TR
mt
=
∑n
j=1 emp sharejm1980 ∗∆HL
TR
jt
,
where emp sharejm1980 is the share of industry j in total employment in the
tradable sector in MSA m in 1980 and ∆HL
TR
jt
is the nationwide change in the
skill ratio between 1980 and 1990 and between 1990 and 2000 in tradable industry
j: if the skill ratio in a specific tradable industry increases at national level, the
MSA where that same industry employs a larger share of the tradable sector
experiences a positive shock to skill intensity.
As a specification check, in the last two columns of Table 4 I use the tradable
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sector where there should be no effect. Equation 6 becomes:
∆Emp ShareTR1jmt = α+ β0(∆
H
L
TR0
mt
) + β1highj +(7)
+β2(∆
H
L
TR0
mt
× highj) + δj + γm + η1990−2000 + εjmt
where ∆Emp ShareTR1jmt is the employment share in a randomly selected part of
the tradable sector (TR1) and ∆HL
TR0
mt
is the change in the log skill ratio in the
rest of the tradable sector (TR0). The instrument is built in an equivalent fashion
as described above using TR0 sectors.
The IV estimates establish what happens to industry employment shares in a
city when the city experiences an increase in the skill ratio that is driven purely
by an increase in the relative demand for college graduates. By contrast, the OLS
estimate establishes the same effect when the increase in the skill ratio may be
driven by either demand or supply shocks.
C. Results on Industry Employment Shares at the MSA Level
Table 4 indicates that an exogenous increase in the skill intensity in the trad-
able industry results in an increase in local employment in the high-skill-intensive
nontradable sector in a city, particularly for those sectors that are education-
elastic. The OLS and IV elasticities of the interaction term are 0.009 and 0.045,
respectively (see columns 1 and 2). The latter indicates that a ten percent in-
crease (in a decade) in the skill ratio in the tradable sector in a city is associated
with a 0.45 percentage points (over an average employment share of 7%) higher
increase in the employment share in skill-intensive nontradables with a high ed-
ucation elasticity (like health and education services) with respect to those with
low education elasticity.
For low-skill-intensive nontradables the effect is null (column 4, IV coefficient on
the interaction); the negative significant OLS coefficient in column 3 indicates that
the negative supply effect of H/L on employment in low-skill-intensive services
seems to prevail (as it is contemplated in the model) when the effect of the
demand shock is not isolated. As expected, due to the national nature of the
demand for tradables, I find that an exogenous increase in skill intensity in one
part of the tradable sector has no significant effect on employment in other parts
of the tradable sector (columns 5 and 6).19
These results are consistent with Moretti (2010) who shows that an exogenous
increase in the number of jobs in the tradable sector in a city results in an increase
in local labor demand in the service sector, and that this effect is larger when
19The effect on the tradable sector is not necessarily zero but should be smaller than the one for the
nontradable sector, and possibly even negative because the increase in wages generated by the initial
shock hurts local producers of tradables.
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the exogenous increase in labor demand is concentrated among skilled workers.
Relative to Moretti (2010) this paper adds the explicit account of consumption
elasticities to the argument that positive demand shocks in the tradable sector
have large multiplier effects on the nontradable sector.
In addition to the CEX-based evidence discussed in the previous section, the
results presented here constitute a second piece of evidence in favor of a role of
consumption elasticities in affecting the final demand of high-skill-intensive goods
and services and through this channel also the demand for skills (i.e. the college
premium).
IV. Quantification of the Demand Shift
So far the evidence suggests that the consumption elasticity channel may con-
tribute to the increase in the college premium, however neither the coefficients of
Table 2 (at the aggregate economy level) nor of Table 4 (at the MSA level) are
informative as to the extent to which an exogenous increase in education raises
or decreases the overall demand for skilled labor. To answer this question, in this
section I parametrize the relationship between the skill premium and the skill
ratio implied by the model of Section I which for convenience I report again here:
(8)
d logwh
d logH
=
(1− a2){(λH − λL)[R1 − (1−R1)HL ]− [1 + λH + HL (1 + λL)]}
(λL + 1)σ + (λH − λL)(1− a1)σ − (λH − λL)T
where T = {R1[εh1p(a1 − a2) + εh1m(1− a2)] + (1−R1)[εl1p(a1 − a2)− a2εl1m]}.
To bring the model to the data, I estimate income and price elasticities of two
consumption aggregates from CEX data (the high-skill-intensive aggregate sums
all 19 consumption items with skill ratio greater than 0.37) and labor market
aggregates from CPS data. Table 5 summarizes the parameters’ values for both
the US and the UK. The details of the parameters’ estimation are in the Appendix
A at the end of the paper, in the following I describe the main results of the
parametrization.
Filling in the relevant elasticities and labor market aggregates of the US econ-
omy of Table 5 in Equation 8, the final result is d logwhd logH = −1.12. This number
must be compared to the counterfactual of what would have happened without
the education and income effect in favor of high-skill-intensive consumption items.
When solved with identical demand functions of skilled and unskilled consumers
(i.e. yh1 (.) = y
l
1(.) = y1(.)) and homotheticity in income, the model of Section
I gives the following counterfactual result (which is a two-sector version of the
basic framework by Katz and Murphy, 1992):
(9)
d logwh
d logH
=
−(1− a2)[1 + λH + HL (1 + λL)]
(λL + 1)σ + (λH − λL)(1− a1)σ − (λH − λL)[ε1p(a1 − a2) + HH+L − a2]
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Table 5—Parameters of the Model
Labor market aggregates λH λL a1 a2
H
L σ
US CPS
1.96 0.45 0.80 0.43 1.22 1.4
UK LFS
2.70 0.84 0.43 0.13 0.24 1.4
Consumption elasticities εh1m ε
l
1m ε
h
1p ε
l
1p ε1p R1
US CEX
1.09 1.08 -0.92 -0.60 -0.53 0.61
UK FES
1.14 1.14 -0.75 -0.82 -0.83 0.28
Note: λH =
H1
H2
,λL =
L1
L2
,a1 =
whH1
p1y1
,a2 =
whH2
p2y2
and H
L
are estimated using CPS and LFS 1994 to
1997. εh1p,ε
l
1p,ε
h
1m,ε
l
1m,R1 are estimated using CEX and FES 1994 to 1997. σ is from Katz and Murphy
(1992).
whose parametrization yields d logwhd logH = −1.22.
The difference between Equation 8 and Equation 9 shows that education and
income elasticities contribute to reduce the extent of the fall of whwl in response to
an increase in HL by 0.10 points (1.22-1.12).
20 To understand the magnitude of
this contribution we need to relate it to the actual increase of the college premium
in the US economy. The result of this exercise is summarized in Table 6 for both
the US and the UK.
The actual skill ratio in the US economy HL increased by 66% between 1984
and 2002 and the college premium whwl increased by 13% (CPS data, H is some
college or more). Equation 8 which incorporates the education and income effect
in favor of skill-intensive consumption items implies that whwl should have fallen
by 74% (-1.12*0.66=-0.74, see column 1 of Table 6) as a result of an increase in HL
20The total effect can be also decomposed in different parts. The direct effect of education elasticities
can be quantified in (1− a2)(λH − λL)[R1 − (1−R1)HL ] = 0.11 in the numerator of Equation 8. In the
denominator the effect through different price and income elasticities across skilled and unskilled workers
can be quantified in the difference between T = {R1[εh1p(a1 − a2) + εh1m(1 − a2)] + (1 − R1)[εl1p(a1 −
a2) − a2εl1m]} and ε1p(a1 − a2). The difference in income elasticities is calculated at R1(1 − a2)εh1m −
(1−R1)a2εl1m =0.20. The difference in price elasticities is calculated at R1(a1− a2)εh1p + (1−R1)(a1−
a2)εl1p − (a1 − a2)ε1p = −0.016.
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Table 6—Quantification of the Income and Education Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model with Model without Difference Demand Contribution
income and educ. income and educ. (1)-(2) shift wh
wl
of elasticities
elasticities elasticities (3)/(4)
US CEX
Implied d logwh
d logH
-1.12 -1.22
Percentage terms (-1.12*0.66)=-74% (-1.22*0.66)=-80% 6% 80%+13% 6.5%
UK FES
Implied d logwh
d logH
-0.87 -0.97
Percentage terms (-0.87*0.88)=-77% (-0.97*0.88)=-85% 8% 85%+14% 8%
Note: The implied d logwh
d logH
are obtained parameterizing Equation 8 and Equation 9 using the parameters
of Table 5. Percentage terms in column 1 and 2 are obtained multiplying the implied d logwh
d logH
by the
actual increase between 1984-2002 in H
L
(in the US=66% and in the UK=88%). The percentage terms
in column 4 are obtained summing the implied decrease of wh
wl
along the relative demand curve of the
counterfactual model, i.e. the number in column 2, to the actual increase between 1984-2002 in wh
wl
(in
the US=13% and in the UK=14%).
of 66%. Equation 9 with identical preferences across educated and non-educated
workers implies a fall of whwl by 80% (-1.22*0.66=-0.80, see column 2 of the table).
This latter result implies that the total shift in relative labor demand is 93%: the
actual 13% plus the counterfactual 80% implied by Equation 9 (column 4 of the
table). Eventually the education and income elasticities in favor of skill-intensive
consumption items reduce by 6% the fall of the relative wage (74% instead of
80%) and 6% points constitute about 6.5% of the 93% total shift in the relative
labor demand (see column 5).
A. Quantification of the Demand Shift for the UK
As for the US, I estimating income and price elasticities of two consumption ag-
gregates from FES data and labor market aggregates from LFS data.21 The result
of the parametrization of Equation 8 is d logwhd logH =-0.87 while the parametrization
of the counterfactual Equation 9 yields a result of -0.97. In the UK the skill ratio
H
L increased by 88% between 1982 and 2000 and the college premium
wh
wl
increased
by 14% (LFS data). Equation 8 implies that the college premium should have
21Table 5 shows that while income and price elasticities are fairly similar across the US and UK, the
value of R1 = 0.28 which defines the education elasticity in the model is much lower in the UK. This is
not surprising because the numerator of R1 is the total expenditure on the 19 high-skill-intensive items
by college-educated workers and the share of college-educated workers is much lower in the UK than
in the US: H
L
= 0.24 in the LFS sample 1994-1997. Also the distribution of college-educated workers
is much more concentrated in the skill-intensive industries in the UK rather than in the US: hence the
higher value of λH =
H1
H2
= 2.7 and the lower value of α2 =
whH2
p2y2
= 0.13 in the UK with respect to the
US.
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fallen by 77% (-0.87*0.88=-0.77, see column 1 of Table 6) while counterfactual
Equation 9 implies a fall of 85% (-0.97*0.88=-0.85, see column 2): a difference of
8%. The total unexplained shift in relative labor demand in the UK is 99% (the
actual 14% plus the counterfactual 85%, see column 4) therefore education and
income elasticities in favor of skill-intensive consumption items can account for
around 8% of the total shift in the relative demand for skilled labor (see column
5).
V. Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper shows that more educated (and richer)
consumers not only consume more of the very low-skill-intensive services such as
cleaning services and household services -as pointed out in Mazzolari and Ragusa
(2013)- but also consume more of high-skill-intensive services such as education
services, medical and professional services. The positive (and J-shaped) relation-
ship between the education (and income) elasticities and the skill-intensity of
consumption goods and services is evident both in the US and in the UK.
At the MSA level the positive relationship between the decadal changes in the
share of skilled workers in the tradable sector in a city and the employment share
of high-skill-intensive nontradable services, confirms that consumption changes
based on education elasticities are likely to favor the demand for skill-intensive
services.
The parametrization of a simple two-sector model suggests that overall the
income and education effects in favor of skill-intensive goods and services can
explain around 6.5% of the total increase in the college premium in the US from
1984 to 2002. Notwithstanding the differences between the US and UK in out of
pocket expenditure in education and health services and in the share of college-
educated workers, the overall results in terms of explanatory power are similar
in the UK (8%), which is an indication of the robustness of this simple model to
parameter changes.
The mechanism based on education and income elasticities can give an ad-
ditional contribution besides the traditional explanations based on technology
or trade to the accounting of the increase in the college premium. Overall the
product demand effect is not large – consistently with the findings of Autor and
Dorn (2013) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2014) but also with the early
literature on wage inequality which emphasized the role of within-industry shifts
rather than between-industry shifts (Berman, Bound, and Machin 1998). How-
ever this mechanism is of great potential interest because of the stable structure
of education (and income) elasticities over time which suggests a constant bias
towards the demand for high-skill-intensive services (and to a lower extent for
low-skill-intensive ones). This bias is also confirmed in the evolution over time of
the shares of consumption of high-skill-intensive goods and services.
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Model Appendix
Here I present the details of the model of Section I and the estimation strategy
of the parameters reported in Table 5. The economy consists of H skilled work-
ers/consumers with a college degree and L unskilled workers/consumers without
a college degree. Let Y1 = F1(H1, L1) and Y2 = F2(H2, L2) denote the production
functions of the high- and low-skill-intensive commodity respectively. The func-
tions are assumed to be CES with elasticity of substitution σ. In this model there
is no technical progress because the focus is on the role of product demand. For
models that incorporate technical change see Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003),
Weiss (2008), Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Autor and Dorn (2013). Labor
markets are competitive and both labor inputs move across sectors to equate their
marginal value. Since Y1 is the high-skill-intensive commodity (or sector), it will
have a larger skill intensity and a higher wage bill share of skilled labor i.e. if we
define a1 =
whH1
p1F1(.)
and a2 =
whH2
p2F2(.)
the wage bill shares of skilled labor in the two
sectors, and λH =
H1
H2
and λL =
L1
L2
the ratios of skilled and unskilled labor, by
definition a1 − a2 > 0 and λH − λL > 0. The general equilibrium is completely
described by the following five equations where the price of the low-skill-intensive
commodity has been normalized to unity, p2 = 1:
p1F1(H1, L1) = wlL1 + whH1(A1)
F2(H −H1, L− L1) = wl(L− L1) + wh(H −H1)(A2)
d log
(
H1
L1
)
= −σd log
(
wh
wl
)
(A3)
d log
(
H −H1
L− L1
)
= −σd log
(
wh
wl
)
(A4)
Hyh1 (p1, wh) + Ly
l
1(p1, wl) = F1(H1, L1)(A5)
The first two equations, A1 and A2, restate the constant returns assumption.
Equations A3 and A4 are definitions of substitution elasticities in a CES technol-
ogy. The last Equation A5 is the market equilibrium condition for commodity Y1.
According to Walras’ law, equilibrium in the factors’ market and in the market of
commodity Y1 implies that the market of commodity Y2 clears. Taking the total
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE THE EFFECT OF PRODUCT DEMAND ON INEQUALITY 29
differential and logs of equations A1-A5:
d log p1 = a1d logwh + (1− a1)d logwl(A6)
(1− a2)d logwl = −a2d logwh(A7)
d logH1 − d logL1 = −σ(d logwh − d logwl)(A8)
(1 + λH)d logH − λHd logH1 − (1 + λL)d logL+ λLd logL1 =(A9)
= −σ(d logwh − d logwl)
R1[ε
h
1pd log p1 + ε
h
1md logwh + d logH] +(A10)
+(1−R1)[d logL+ εl1pd log p1 + εl1md logwl] = a1d logH1 + (1− a1)d logL1
Assuming total labor supply is fixed i.e. dH = −dL, substituting equations A6
to A9 in A10 we obtain:
(A11)
d logwh
d logH
=
(1− a2){(λH − λL)[R1 − (1−R1)HL ]− [1 + λH + HL (1 + λL)]}
(λL + 1)σ + (λH − λL)(1− a1)σ − (λH − λL)T
where T = {R1[εh1p(a1 − a2) + εh1m(1 − a2)] + (1 − R1)[εl1p(a1 − a2) − a2εl1m]}.22
The parameters of the equation above (which are reported in Table 5) are esti-
mated in the following way. To match the two-sector nature of the model, the 38
consumption items and the corresponding industries in Table 1 in the paper are di-
vided in two aggregate consumption items and two aggregate production sectors.
The high-skill-intensive (low-skill-intensive) aggregate consumption item is the
sum of the expenditure shares in the 19 high-skill-intensive (low-skill-intensive)
consumption items. The high-skill-intensive (low-skill-intensive) aggregate pro-
duction sector is the sum of the number of workers in the 19 high-skill-intensive
(low-skill-intensive) production sectors. Parameters estimated from the CPS sam-
ple 1994-1997: λH =
H1
H2
= 1.96 (λL =
L1
L2
= 0.45) is the sum of the number of
workers with (without) some college education who work in the 19 high-skill-
intensive industries divided by those who work in the 19 low-skill-intensive in-
dustries. The wage bill share of workers with some college education in the 19
high-skill-intensive industries is α1 =
whH1
p1y1
= 0.80; in the 19 low-skill-intensive
industries it is α2 =
whH2
p2y2
= 0.43.23 The skill ratio is HL = 1.22. Parameters
estimated from the CEX sample 1994-1997: the education elasticity is defined by
R1 which is the share of expenditure on the skill-intensive aggregate consump-
22The relationship between wh
wl
and H
L
depends on substitution elasticities in the production func-
tion and on price and income elasticities of demand for high-skill-intensive goods which in turn reflect
elasticities of substitution of high-skill-intensive and low-skill-intensive goods in consumption. Obviously
factors should not be perfect substitutes in production (σi 6=∞) nor goods should be perfect substitutes
in consumption (εi1p 6=∞).
23a1 and a2 are calculated assuming constant returns to scale i.e. p1y1 = wlL1 + whH1 and p2y2 =
wlL2 +whH2. The value of production in the high-skill and in the low-skill-intensive sector is calculated
summing the wages of all workers in that sector.
30 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
tion item by college-educated workers: R1 =
Hyh1 (.)
Hyh1 (.)+Ly
l
1(.)
= 0.61 (which is higher
than the share of educated workers HH+L = 0.55 and therefore increases inequality
in the model). Due to the normalization in the model with respect to the low
skill sector, the elasticities εi1m and ε
i
1p (where i is the education group) are ex-
pressed in relative terms and they refer to consumption of the high-skill-intensive
aggregate good relative to the low-skill-intensive good. The estimation takes into
account a system of two equations and the constraints imposed by the theory:
ω1i = γ1X
′
i + β1 log xi + θ1 log(
p1
p2
) + ζ1 + ε1i(A12)
ω2i = γ2X
′
i + β2 log xi + θ2 log(
p1
p2
) + ζ2 + ε2i
where ω1i indicates the sum of the expenditure shares by household i on the 19
high-skill-intensive items produced in sector 1 and ω2i the sum of the expenditure
shares on the 19 low-skill-intensive items produced in sector 2; log xi is log total
expenditure for household i deflated by the CPI and Xi contains age and sex of the
head and the number of children in the household. Prices are aggregated using
the weighted geometric mean (Stone price index) over prices which have been
normalized to one: log p1 =
∑19
j=1wj log pj is an aggregate price index constructed
using the individual commodity price series log pj of the 19 high-skill-intensive
items and their annual shares in total expenditure wj as weights (the same holds
for log p2 and the 19 low-skill-intensive items). The standard errors are clustered
at the household level. The system A12 is estimated stacking the two equations in
a fixed effect regression and imposing the homogeneity and symmetry constraints.
To be consistent with a demand system
∑
(ω1i+ω2i) = 1, the following restrictions
are imposed: ζ1 + ζ2 = 1, γ1 + γ2 = 0, β1 + β2 = 0 (homogeneity in income) and
θ1 + θ2 = 0 (homogeneity and symmetry in prices coincide given that there is
a single relative price index). Two separate systems are estimated to calculate
income elasticities of households with skilled and unskilled heads. The income
(price) elasticities reported in Table 5 are calculated at the average household
characteristics and are equal to ε1m =
β̂1
ω +1 (ε1p =
θ̂1
ω −1) where ω is the average
expenditure share. To calculate income and price elasticities of skilled workers, I
use ω, β̂1, θ̂1 of the sample of workers with some-college education; to calculate the
elasticities of unskilled workers I use the corresponding parameters of the sample
of workers without college education. Consistently with the predictions of the
model income elasticities of the skill-intensive aggregate are higher than one for
both education groups and both the US and UK.
